Corporate elites and corporate strategy: how demographic preferences and structural position shape the scope of the firm
结合高层梯队与代理理论，研究企业精英的个人特征如何在不同代理情境下影响多元化与收购等战略决策，并指出使用董事会或高管团队等聚合分析单位的缺陷。
Abstract This study combines elements of the upper echelons and agency perspectives to resolve some of the ambiguity surrounding how corporate elites affect corporate strategy. We propose and test the notion that while differences in individual characteristics of corporate elites may imply different preferences for particular corporate strategies such as diversification and acquisitions, these basic preferences, when situated in different agency contexts (e.g., CEO, outsider director, non‐CEO top management team member), generate very different strategic outcomes. Our detailed empirical findings, based on extensive longitudinal governance and corporate strategy data from large U.S. corporations, also highlight the pitfalls of using aggregate units of analysis (e.g., board of directors or top management team) when studying the influence of corporate elites on corporate strategy. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.