Economic and Social Security in the Twenty‐first Century, with Attention to Europe
探索长期政策，寻求事前风险分担效率与事后生产效率的次优折中，主张对低技能工人提供工资补贴、改善资本与劳动及代际间的风险分担，并考虑道德风险等限制。
A partly heuristic attempt is made to explore long‐run policies aimed at a second‐best compromise between ex ante risk‐sharing efficiency and ex post productive efficiency. Wage subsidies for low‐skilled workers financed by taxes on high wages are advocated, together with improved risk sharing between capital and labour, between generations and among the countries belonging to EMU. The scope of the policies advocated is limited by considerations of moral hazard, time consistency and fiscal competition. Moreover, estimates of some key economic parameters remain very imprecise. Several avenues of further research are identified.