Coordinated voting in sequential and simultaneous elections: some experimental evidence
通过实验室实验，研究在存在收益外部性的两选项选举中，序贯投票与同步投票如何影响选民协调投票于同一选项，并考察信息充分程度对协调效果的作用。
Abstract This paper studies a situation wherein a set of voters choose between two alternatives in the presence of a payoff externality. Specifically, regardless of her intrinsic preference, a voter's payoff is maximized should she vote for the alternative that garners a majority of the votes cast. Are votes coordinated on a single alternative? Using laboratory experiments, we examine voting patterns in sequential voting and simultaneous voting elections. Across both election types, we also vary the amount of information that an individual voter has regarding the intrinsic preferences of the other voters. Our main findings are as follows. In the “low” information treatment, sequential voting elections facilitate coordinated voting. However, in the “high” information treatment, voting patterns are not dependent on how the election is structured.