Monitoring, Liquidation, and Security Design
研究在道德风险背景下，有信息优势的银行融资如何通过可信的清算威胁发挥作用，解释为何银行债务通常有担保、优先级高且集中持有，并分析混合融资中合谋的影响。
By identifying the possibility of imposing a creditable threat of liquidation as the key role of informed (bank) finance in a moral hazard context, we characterize the circumstances under which a mixture of informed and uninformed (market) finance is optimal, and explain why bank debt is typically secured, senior, and tightly held. We also show that the effectiveness of mixed finance may be impaired by the possibility of collusion between the firms and their informed lenders, and that in the optimal renegotiation-proof contract informed debt capacity will be exhausted before appealing to supplementary uninformed finance.