Status Effects and Negative Utility Growth
通过一个增长模型解释幸福感停滞现象，模型中人们关心炫耀性消费。正常品带来直接效用，地位品只以他人为代价提供效用。企业通过研发提升两种商品质量。消费者博弈的纳什均衡导致地位品支出份额随其改进次数增加。随着经济增长，创新资源完全转向地位品研发，长期效用增长率为负。
This paper explains the observed stagnation of ‘happiness' measures through a growth model in which agents care about conspicuous consumption. ‘Normal goods’ confer direct utility, while ‘status goods’ confer utility only at the expense of others. Firms can improve the quality of both goods through R&D. The Nash equilibrium of the consumer game results in the share of expenditure on status goods increasing with the number of times the status good has been improved. As the economy grows, resources for innovation are transferred entirely to status‐good R&D. The resulting long‐run rate of utility growth is negative.