Accounting Transparency and the Asset Substitution Problem
建立模型说明透明会计可能加剧债务的资产替代效应，并比较历史成本与成本与市价孰低法两种会计制度在不同债务水平下的效率差异，为资本结构决策提供参考。
ABSTRACT: We develop a model to show that transparent accounting can worsen the asset substitution effect of debt. This negative effect can outweigh the usual positive effect of transparency. We demonstrate this point by comparing pure historical cost accounting to the conservatively skewed accounting regime of lower-of-cost-or-market (LCM). In a market with asymmetric information, the two regimes lead to different degrees of transparency. The more transparent LCM regime produces more efficient results for firms with lower debt levels, while the opaque rule of pure historical cost accounting is preferable for higher debt levels. We explore the implications of this result for the firm's optimal capital structure.