Market Feedback, Investment Constraints, and Managerial Behavior
利用英国固定价格IPO样本，发现IPO股价表现不佳会显著影响管理层后续投资决策；投资机会更好、固定资产比例更低的企业对负面市场反馈更敏感，且反应更积极的企业长期业绩更好。
Abstract This paper examines the joint role of market feedback and investment constraints on managerial behavior. Using a sample of UK fixed price initial public offerings, we show that underperformance of share returns at the IPO significantly affects managerial investment decisions in the period after the offering. Firms with better investment opportunities and proportionately lower fixed (higher intangible) assets are more sensitive to negative market feedback. Over the longer term, the more responsive firms perform significantly better than their non‐responsive counterparts. The findings contribute to the debate on the informational advantage of managers over investors and present strong evidence that the market, on aggregate, can provide a superior assessment of a firm's opportunities. Managers who are able to respond to negative market feedback can significantly improve their firm's future prospects.