Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types
研究了在准线性环境下单一商品有效分配问题，提出区分“支付类型”和“信念类型”的方法，并刻画了有限类型空间上部分贝叶斯实施有效分配的条件。
We consider the efficient allocation of a single good with interdependent values in a quasilinear environment. We present an approach to modeling interdependent preferences distinguishing between “payoff types” and “belief types” and report a characterization of when the efficient allocation can be partially Bayesian implemented on a finite type space. The characterization can be used to unify a number of sufficient conditions for efficient partial implementation in this classical auction setting. We report how a canonical language for discussing interdependent types - developed in a more general setting by Bergemann, Morris and Takahashi (2011) - applies in this setting and note by example that this canonical language will not allow us to distinguish some types in the payoff type - belief type language.