Regulatory enforcement with competitive endogenous audit mechanisms
理论构建并实验测试了两种内生审计机制，通过同期相对比较（基于披露信息或不完全合规信号）在主体间制造合规竞争，解释了低审计率和低预期处罚下多数主体仍保持合规的典型事实。
This article adds to the regulatory compliance literature through the theoretical development and experimental testing of two endogenous audit mechanisms that use contemporaneous relative comparisons, based on disclosed information or imperfect signals of compliance effort, to generate a compliance competition among agents. This type of audit mechanism has some advantages over the more widely studied dynamic audit mechanisms that condition an agent's audit probability on past compliance, and provides an alternative explanation for the stylized fact, in many settings, that most agents are compliant most of the time even though audit rates and expected penalties are low.