Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology
研究新技术采用时机博弈中先发制人的影响，发现双寡头下威胁先发制人会均等化租金，但寡头市场不成立；若先发制人收益很小，延迟采用的对称结果可成为均衡，与Reinganum的扩散结论不同。
We study the adoption of a new technology to illustrate the effects of preemption in games of timing. We show that the threat of preemption equalizes rents in a duopoly, but that this result does not extend to the general oligopoly game. If the gain to preemption is sufficiently small, then the optimal symmetric outcome, which involves "late" adoption, is an equilibrium. This contrasts with Reinganum's result that in precommitment equilibria there must be "diffusion". We develop a new and richer formalism for modeling games of timing, which permits a continuous-time representation of the limit of discrete-time mixed-strategy equilibria.