CONTROL ALLOCATION, REVENUE SHARING, AND JOINT OWNERSHIP*
构建了一个两期双重道德风险模型，研究合资企业中单方控制权对最优收益分享和控制权分配的影响，发现单方控制可能导致低效的私人收益攫取，此时共同所有权和控制权可能更优。
This article develops a two‐period double moral hazard model with incomplete contracting to explore the implication of a possible adverse effect of unilateral control on the optimal revenue sharing and control allocation in a joint venture. We identify conditions under which joint ownership and control become optimal when unilateral control gives the controlling party opportunities to inefficiently extract private benefits at the expense of the joint revenue. Moreover, this adverse consequence of control may also lead to the separation of share ownership and control, i.e., it may be optimal for the minority owner to have the control rights.