Hospital Market Structure and the Behavior of Not-for-Profit Hospitals
利用医院财务激励的变化，研究非营利医院的行为是否与周边营利性医院的占比有关。结果发现，在营利性医院密集的地区，非营利医院对激励变化的反应更显著，表明它们会模仿营利性医院的行为。
I exploit a change in hospital financial incentives to examine whether the behavior of private not-for-profit hospitals is systematically related to the share of nearby hospitals organized as for-profit firms. My findings demonstrate that not-for-profit hospitals in for-profit intensive areas are significantly more responsive to the change than their counterparts in areas served by few for-profit providers. Differences in financial constraints and other observable factors correlated with for-profit hospital penetration do not explain the heterogeneous response. The findings suggest that not-for-profit hospitals mimic the behavior of private for-profit providers when they actively compete with them.