Investment and Screening under Asymmetric Endogenous Information
分析在完全但不完美信息环境下的甄别合同，代理人面临套牢问题，通过随机化投资策略和委托人提供甄别合同来避免套牢，均衡合同提供的信息租金为投资提供资金。
This article provides an analysis of screening contracts in a complete but imperfect information environment as opposed to the usual incomplete information (Bayesian) environment. An agent faces a hold-up situation while making a cost-reducing specific investment that is not observed by the principal. To prevent the hold-up, the agent randomizes his investment strategy and the principal offers a screening contract. The informational rents provided by the equilibrium contract finance the investment. For a large class of cost functions, the randomization is such that the marginal surplus follows a Power distribution.