Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship
研究受监管企业拥有私人信息且信息可能通过业绩暴露时的多期模型。若监管者无法承诺未来政策，会利用企业暴露的信息，导致分离政策不可行。提出一种“公平”安排，企业同意不退出，监管者允许其获得非负利润，并分析该安排的优劣。
This paper considers a multiperiod model of a regulated firm that has (stationary) private information which may be revealed through performance. If it cannot make commitments to future policies, the regulator has an incentive to exploit any information the firm reveals, and Laffont and Tirole show that there is no regulatory policy that is separating over any closed interval. A "fairness" arrangement is proposed in which the firm agrees not to quit if in future periods the regulator allows it to earn a nonnegative profit given the type it revealed in earlier periods. The properties of such arrangements are studied, and an example is presented in which both the firm and the regulator prefer a fairness arrangement to a policy feasible without commitment.