Capital Investments and Price Agreements in Semicollusive Markets
研究半合谋市场，企业长期竞争（如资本投资）但短期合谋（如价格），分析长期竞争对短期合谋的破坏效应，并解释广告与竞争负相关的现象。
We consider a semicollusive market where firms compete in a long-run variable, such as investment in capital or capacity, and collude with respect to a short-run variable, such as price or market shares. Our concern is with the potential destabilizing effect of the long-run competition on the short-run collusion. We show that under a certain refinement of the equilibrium, the set of equilibria is reduced to include just the one in which the collusive agreement is stable. We then lend some support to the phenomenon of an inverse association between advertising and competition by investigating the conditions under which overcapitalization occurs in the above equilibrium.