Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: A Signalling Equilibrium
识别出一个存在应税股息的信号均衡，其中内部人通过分配更多股息来传递其私人信息，同时解释了为何有些公司既发股息又发新股，而有些公司不发股息。
ABSTRACT A signalling equilibrium with taxable dividends is identified. In this equilibrium, corporate insiders with more valuable private information optimally distribute larger dividends and receive higher prices for their stock whenever the demand for cash by both their firm and its current stockholders exceeds its internal supply of cash. In equilibrium, many firms distribute dividends and simultaneously issue new stock, while other firms pay no dividends. Because dividends reveal all private information not conveyed by corporate audits, current stockholders capture in equilibrium all economic rents net of dissipative signalling costs. Both the announcement effect and the relationship between dividends and cum‐dividend market values are derived explicitly.