The Economics of Workout Lending
构建模型区分有益和有害的工作贷款，分析多债权人面对困境借款人时的集体行动问题，并讨论对审慎贷款限额和刺激向困境债务国放贷政策的启示。
Lenders are forced to consider a workout loan when a borrower loses access to financial markets and must seek loans from existing creditors to continue servicing outstanding loans. A model of the loan decision is developed that distinguishes socially-useful from socially-wasteful workout loans. The analysis is extended to examine two collective-action problems that may arise when many lenders have claims on a troubled borrower. The paper concludes with a consideration of the implications of the model for the establishment of prudential lending limits and of policies to stimulate new lending to troubled debtor countries. Copyright 1989 by Ohio State University Press.