Reporting Bias with an Audit Committee
研究了经理私下向独立审计委员会报告盈余，审计委员会经尽职调查后修改报告并加入自身偏差，从而改变报告、估值和激励的动态关系。
ABSTRACT: This study models a manager who privately reports earnings to an independent audit committee that, after its own due diligence, modifies the report for public release to investors. The audit committee alters the reporting and valuation dynamics by attempting to remove the manager's reporting bias, but then presents the information it has collected with its own bias. The audit committee's presence changes the impact of penalties and incentives on reporting, valuation, and due-diligence activities. For example, increasing penalties can sometimes degrade the reporting process. Our simultaneous consideration of the manager, audit committee, and investors provides a new framework for reporting and valuation, and sheds light on empirical earnings quality research that has largely studied the management and audit effects separately.