Managerial Compensation and the Cost of Moral Hazard
利用多期委托代理模型和纵向数据，估计了管理层薪酬的激励效应，发现忽视道德风险会导致企业巨大损失，而通过薪酬契约激励管理者与股东利益一致的成本远低于收益。
This article investigates managerial compensation and its incentive effects. Our econometric framework is derived from a multiperiod principal‐agent model with moral hazard. Longitudinal data on returns to firms and managerial compensation are used to estimate the model. We find that firms would incur large losses from ignoring moral hazard, whereas managers only require moderate additional compensation for accepting a contract that ties their wealth to the value of the firm. Thus the costs of aligning hidden managerial actions to shareholder goals through the compensation schedule are much less than the benefits from the resulting managerial performance.