Minorities and Endogenous Segregation
用理论模型分析婚姻市场中隔离作为均衡现象，发现色盲均衡通常效率低下，而隔离策略在某些情况下能提高整体福利，但可能损害少数群体利益。
A theoretical analysis is proposed of segregation as an equilibrium phenomenon in a random-matching model of the marriage market. Otherwise identical partners possess a pay-off-irrelevant characteristic, colour. We derive the set of colour-blind equilibria and show that they are generically constrained inefficient. Equilibrium segregation strategies are strategies that condition actions on the type of match. It is shown that distributions of types exist such that segregation equilibrium pay-offs Pareto dominate colour-blind pay-offs. For other distributions, segregation also generates conflict, where the majority unambiguously gains, while the minority group may lose. Giving preferential treatment, that is, minority bias, can increase overall welfare. Copyright 2006, Wiley-Blackwell.