Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria
提出弱序贯理性的概念，放宽了Kreps和Wilson的序贯理性要求，并证明在完美信息博弈中通过信念限制可实现逆向归纳结果，在不完美信息例子中序贯理性并非均衡和可信威胁的必然结果。
A weakening of D. Kreps and R. Wilson's (1982) notion of sequential rationality is presented. The motivation stems from the difficulty in justifying sequentially rational behavior in subgames reachable only through a violation of sequential rationality. Although the present notion of weak sequential rationality is based upon extensive form considerations, it bears a close relation to R. Selten's (1975) normal form perfect equilibria. Backward induction outcomes can be achieved in generic games of perfect information with additional restrictions on beliefs. An example with imperfect information shows that sequential rationality is not the consequence of equilibrium play and the absence of incredible threats. Copyright 1992 by The Econometric Society.