The Intra-Household Economics of Voice and Exit
批判了传统家庭经济学忽视性别和年龄权力关系的缺陷，比较了合作与非合作家庭议价模型，指出非合作模型更能解释家庭内部权力差异和资源分配过程，并提出了跨学科研究议程。
This article evaluates the feminist and institutional dimensions of intra-household economics. A brief intellectual history of this emerging subfield of microeconomics argues that the weakness of the New Home Economics lies not only in its failure to deal with the individuals that make up the family, but also in its lack of recognition of systematic, gender- and age-based power relations which structure household resource allocation. A critical review of cooperative household bargaining models shows that while these effectively capture preference and externally-derived bargaining power heterogeneity among family members, they treat individuals symmetrically with respect to their ''voice'' (the right and ability to enter into the household bargaining process) and ''exit'' (the socially and economically constructed alternatives facing household members in the absence of a cooperative solution), and say little about the actual processes that lead to household resource allocation decisions. Noncooperative intra-household models, on the other hand, offer richer characterizations of household structures and processes, and can endogenously account for differences in power among family members. The final section proposes a research agenda emphasizing an interdisciplinary approach to both intrahousehold theory and empirical analysis.