NONLINEAR INCOME TAXATION AND MATCHING GRANTS IN A FEDERATION WITH DECENTRALIZED IN‐KIND TRANSFERS*
研究联邦制下地方政府提供实物转移支付时的最优非线性所得税和配套补助，发现分散化实物转移支付比单一政府更能缓解自我选择约束、促进再分配，且配套补助结构与以往研究不同。
We extend to a fiscal federalism setting the literature on redistributive in‐kind transfers in the presence of nonlinear income taxation. Local governments have a cost advantage, motivating decentralization of the in‐kind transfer. The cost structure varies across regions, and the central government cannot observe which region is which. We show that decentralized in‐kind transfers can, in this setting, be an even more important instrument for relaxing self‐selection constraints, thus, helping redistribution, than in single‐government models. We characterize the optimal marginal tax rates and matching grants. The grants have a very different structure than the one derived in earlier studies.