Monitoring process quality in off‐shore outsourcing: A model and findings from multi‐country survey
研究了买方如何利用信息技术实时监控离岸外包供应商的生产过程，通过博弈模型推导出最低质量阈值，并发现复杂易错的过程反而监控更少，多国调查数据支持了模型结论。
Abstract We investigate how recent advances in information technology and telecommunications have led to real‐time monitoring of processes at the site of the provider by a buyer located across the globe. We construct a game‐theoretic model of the dynamics of the buyer–supplier interaction in the presence of moral hazard and incomplete contracting. We derive the Minimum Quality Threshold (MQT) below which the provider's output will certainly be inspected. Our findings show that the buyer can pick a level of monitoring and thereby force the provider to exceed the quality level of the MQT in output quality and avoid costly and wasteful inspection. Finally, our model explains why the production of processes that are complex and more prone to errors are actually monitored less by the buyers. We furnish the results of a comprehensive, multi‐year, multi‐country survey of the efficacy of monitoring in off‐shore outsourcing projects and demonstrate strong empirical support for the findings of the model.