Capital Structure with Countervailing Incentives
受监管企业面临双重激励：向资本市场传递高价值信号以提升市值，同时向监管者传递高成本信号以推动费率上调。当投资规模较大时，反向激励导致高成本与低成本企业在均衡中选择相同资本结构，从而切断资本结构与私有信息的关联；投资规模较小时则可能出现分离均衡。
The regulatedjirm's choice of capital structure is affected by countervailing incentives: the jirm wishes to signal high value to capital markets to boost its market value while also signalling high cost to regulators to induce rate increases. When the jim's investment is large, countervailing incentives lead both high- and low-cost jims to choose the same capital structure in equilibrium, thus decoupling capital structure from private information. When investment is small or medium-sized, the model may admit separating equilibria in which high-cost jirrns issue greater equity and low-cost jims rely more on debt jinancing.