The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions and Central Bank Independence
利用公民候选人模型研究政府对劳动力市场和中央银行制度的选择，分析其对通胀和就业的影响，发现独立央行能降低平均通胀和通胀波动，但就业波动可能更高或更低。
Using the citizen–candidate model we study the government’s choice of institutions for the labour market and the central bank and derive the implications for inflation and employment. We derive conditions for the existence of equilibria in which the labour market is distorted and the central bank is dependent or independent under a range of conditions affecting central bank dependence, the post–election cycle in inflation and employment and inflation bias. <br/>Our results imply that average inflation and inflation variability are lower under an independent central bank whereas employment variability can be lower or higher, consistent with evidence for OECD countries.