Limits to Institutional Reforms
运用宏观经济政策理论，讨论新制度经济学中的隐性政策决定论，指出知识稀缺导致政策模型不完整且多变，模型竞争为专家在社会变革中创造了角色。
The essay draws on the theory of (macro)economic policy, as it has evolved, to discuss implicit policy determinism in the new economics of institutions. The extension of rational‐choice methods to new levels of analysis, such as micropolitics, macropolitics, political macroeconomics, and microfoundations of cooperation, has apparently reduced the policy choice set and diminished the role of experts. All outcomes reflect constrained maximization by rational agents. The essay argues, however, that scarcity of knowledge leads to incomplete and variable policy models, and that competition among policy models creates a role for experts in social change.