Explaining the Whistle-Blowing Process: Suggestions from Power Theory and Justice Theory
研究了法律制裁与组织法律主义回应在鼓励举报方面的效果差异，发现组织设计的法律主义机制比法律程序更有效，并从权力与正义理论角度解释这一悖论，提出政策建议。
Review of research concerning whistle-blowing suggests that legal sanctions have been singularly unsuccessful in encouraging whistle-blowing but that legalistic responses by organizations seem to have been somewhat more successful. Below, we review three sets of studies that illustrate this point. The first set includes federal employees, both before and after a legal change intended to encourage whistle-blowing. The second study examines the effects of state laws, by comparing states with whistle-blowing statutes to those without such statutes. The third study focuses on whistle-blowers who are role prescribed and therefore have legalistic protections but not legal protections. Results from these three sets of studies suggest that legal procedures seem not to be effective in encouraging positive organizational responses to whistle-blowing, but legalistic responses designed by the organizations themselves have more positive effects both for the whistle-blowers and for the organizations themselves. We attempt to resolve this apparent paradox by considering two theoretical frameworks, power relations and justice theory, and using these frameworks to predict the behaviors of both whistle-blowers and their organizations when legal mechanisms are involved and when legalistic mechanisms are used. Finally, drawing on the implications of our theoretical analysis, we provide policy suggestions for the encouragement of legalistic mechanisms, in addition to legal mechanisms, to persuade organizations to respond positively to whistle-blowers.