交易成本与生产的高效组织:木材采伐合同研究

Transactions Costs and the Efficient Organization of Production: A Study of Timber-Harvesting Contracts

Journal of Political Economy · 1991
被引 158
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

构建交易成本框架,解释木材采伐合同中一次性付款与单位付款的选择,并用北卡罗来纳州数据验证,发现交易成本模型优于风险模型。

Abstract

A transaction costs framework is developed to explain the choice between lump-sum and per unit payment provisions in private timber-harvesting contracts. Predictions about which contract type minimizes the transaction costs of presale measurement and contract enforcement and monitoring are derived and tested using private timber sales contracts from North Carolina. The empirical results provide strong support for the transaction costs approach and also reject several predictions from a risk-based model. The transaction costs framework also provides insights into the choice between negotiated and competitive sales procedures. Copyright 1991 by University of Chicago Press.

交易成本木材采伐合同合同选择契约效率