Bundling as an Entry Barrier
研究寡头市场中捆绑策略的进入威慑效应，发现拥有两种产品市场势力的在位企业通过捆绑销售，能有效阻止仅拥有一种产品的潜在竞争者进入市场，且该效应带来的收益远超传统的价格歧视动机。
In this paper we look at the case for bundHng in an oHgopohstic environment. We show that bundhng is a particularly effective entry-deterrent strategy. A company that has market power in two goods, A and B, can, by bundling them together, make it harder for a rival with only one of these goods to enter the market. Bundling allows an incumbent to credibly defend both products without having to price low in each. The traditional explanation for bundling that economists have given is that it serves as an effective tool of price discrimination by a monopolist. Although price discrimination provides a reason to bundle, the gains are small compared with the gains from the entry-deterrent effect.