The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior
研究双边讨价还价行为的演化基础，分析固执型与精明型策略在确定和不确定环境下的演化均衡，发现确定环境下演化偏好平分，而噪音环境可能同时出现精明与贪婪固执行为并导致冲突。
The paper examines the evolutionary foundations of bilateral bargaining behavior. Interaction is assumed to be personal, in the sense that agents may recognize each others' bargaining strategies. In particular, the model allows interaction between “obstinate” agents, whose demands are independent of the opponent, and “sophisticated” agents, who adapt to their opponent's expected play. When the pie's size is certain, evolution favors obstinate agents who insist on getting at least half the pie. The unique outcome is an equal split. In sufficiently noisy environments, sophisticated behavior appears in equilibrium together with greedy obstinate behavior. There is then a positive probability of conflict.