Nonuniform Bertrand Competition
研究了企业采用非均匀价格策略时的伯特兰竞争，发现自由进入下均衡实现零利润和最小平均成本生产，且若有多家企业则价格收敛为统一最低平均成本价；无自由进入时价格可能不统一，企业利润为正但相等，消费者平均支出不高于边际成本。
The feasibility of Bertrand undercutting with nonuniform prices is established and properties are derived for Bertrand equilibrium in nonuniform price strategies. With free entry, equilibrium entails zero-profit minimum average cost production. If there is more than one producing firm, all prices collapse to a minimum average cost uniform price. An existence condition is compared to conditions from uniform price theory. Without free entry equilibrium, prices may not collapse to a uniform price. Positive profit may occur but all firms earn equal profit and incur equal marginal cost, while consumers pay average outlay no greater than marginal cost. Copyright 1992 by The Econometric Society.