Competition and the Use of Foggy Pricing
研究了美国早期移动电话行业从垄断转向竞争时，企业是否更少使用利用消费者错误的模糊定价策略，并提出了三种衡量套餐模糊程度的方法。
Firms engage in foggy pricing when the menu of tariff options aims at profiting from consumer mistakes. The analysis of this paper concludes that the transition from monopoly to competition in the early US cellular telephone industry does not generally foster the use of such deceptive strategies. I offer three alternative measures to account for the fogginess of the menu of options offered by cellular carriers. All results are robust to the existence of uncertainty regarding future consumption at the time of choosing a particular tariff option, as well as to consumers' heterogeneity with respect to cellular telephone usage.