Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
分析按组织内个人排序而非产出水平支付薪酬的合同，证明风险中性下排序工资与按产出激励同样有效，且风险厌恶者可能更偏好排序工资；同时探讨能力异质性导致的逆向选择问题。
This paper analyzes compensation schemes which pay according to an individual's ordinal rank in an organization rather than his output level. When workers are risk neutral, it is shown that wages based upon rank induce the same efficient allocation of resources as an incentive reward scheme based on individual output levels. Under some circumstances, risk-averse workers actually prefer to be paid on the basis of rank. In addition, if workers are heterogeneous in ability, low-quality workers attempt to contaminate high-quality firms, resulting in adverse selection. However, if ability is known in advance, a competitive handicapping structure exists which allows all workers to compete efficiently in the same organization.