Firm-Specific Human Capital and Optimal Capital Structure
研究经理人因担心失业而少投入企业特定人力资本的道德风险，企业通过长期工资合同应对，但破产机制使债务加剧道德风险，从而与债务税盾权衡形成最优资本结构。
The authors consider the moral hazard in managers undersupplying imperfectly-marketable, firm-specific human capital. Firms may cope by granting long-term wage contracts that protect managers against employment termination. Although ex ante efficient, these contracts may be ex post inefficient when managerial ability is discovered to be low. Precommitted firms must honor these contracts, unless there is ownership transfer that permits their legal invalidation. Bankruptcy is one such transfer mechanism. Since managers anticipate the contractual consequence of bankruptcy, leverage worsens moral hazard; this cost provides a counterbalance to the debt tax shield and leads to an optimal capital structure. Copyright 1994 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.