质量披露与认证:理论与实践

Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice

Journal of Economic Literature · 2010
被引 737
人大 A-ABS 4

中文导读

综述质量披露与认证的理论和实证文献,探讨为何卖家不自愿披露、是否应强制披露,以及认证机构是否报告准确信息,并回顾医疗、教育和金融领域的实证证据。

Abstract

This essay reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on quality disclosure and certification. After comparing quality disclosure with other quality assurance mechanisms and describing a brief history of quality disclosure, we address two sets of theoretical issues. First, why don't sellers voluntarily disclose through a process of “unraveling” and, given the lack of unraveling, is it desirable to mandate seller disclosure? Second, when we rely on certifiers to act as the intermediary of quality disclosure, do certifiers necessarily report unbiased and accurate information? We further review empirical evidence on these issues, with a particular focus on healthcare, education, and finance. The empirical review covers quality measurement, the effect of third-party disclosure on consumer choice and seller behavior, as well as the economics of certifiers.

质量披露认证信息披露理论