Local Institutions and the Dynamics of Community Sorting
通过实验室实验研究居民对公共品供给偏好不同时如何分选到不同社区，发现强制平等纳税能形成稳定同质社区，但居民常未达最优供给水平；允许投票加迁移则使社区达到最有效结果。
This paper studies the dynamics by which populations with heterogeneous preferences for public good provision sort themselves into communities. I conduct laboratory experiments to consider which institutions best facilitate efficient self-organization when residents can move freely between locations. I find that institutions requiring all residents of a community to pay equal taxes enable subjects to sort into stable, homogeneous communities. Though sorted, residents often fail to attain the provision level best suited for them. When residents can vote for local tax policies with ballots, along with their feet, each community converges to the most efficient outcome for its population.