Affiliation and Entry in First-Price Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders: An Analysis of Merger Effects
研究了俄勒冈州木材拍卖中兼并的影响，提出了关联私人价值框架下的进入与投标模型，通过结构估计和反事实分析发现卖家可能从某些兼并中受益。
We study the effects of mergers in timber sale auctions in Oregon. We propose an entry and bidding model within the affiliated private value (APV) framework and with heterogeneous bidders, and establish existence of the entry equilibrium and existence and uniqueness of the bidding equilibrium when the joint distribution of private values belongs to the class of Archimedean copulas. We estimate the resulting structural model, and study merger effects through counterfactual analyses using the structural estimates. We evaluate how merger effects depend on affiliation, entry, and the auction mechanism and find that the seller may benefit from some mergers.