Capital Precommitment and Competition in Supply Schedules
结合资本承诺与供给计划竞争，在柯布-道格拉斯技术和常弹性需求假设下，推导出介于古诺和伯特兰之间的加价均衡。
Although the Cournot and Bertrand equilibrium concepts have \ndominated economic analysis of oligopoly problems, neither has a \ncompelling theoretical rationale. However, notions of capacity \ncommitment have been used to rationalize the Cournot equilibrium. \nAt the same time, the idea of competition in supply schedules under \nuncertainty has been used by Klemperer and Meyer to derive an \nequilibrium concept intermediate between Cournot and Bertrand. In \nthis paper, we combine these two approaches and show that under the \nassumptions of Cobb-Douglas technology and constant elasticity \ndemand, an equilibrium in markups can result.