Can markets stimulate rights? On the alienability of legal claims
构建委托代理模型，研究诉讼融资者如何通过减少生产不确定性来影响法律发展，发现诉讼融资者偏好新颖案件，且社会剩余与法律不确定性正相关。
The alienability of legal claims holds the promise of increasing access to justice and fostering development of law. I develop a principal‐agent framework where litigation funders provide expertise in reducing uncertainty in agents' disutility of production. The model leads to the counterintuitive prediction that litigation funders prefer cases with novel issues, and social surplus is positively correlated with legal uncertainty. Consistent with the model, court backlog, court expenditures, and a slowing in average time to completion are associated with third‐party funding; cases with third‐party funding receive more citations and are reversed less often than comparable cases without such arrangements.