THE OPTIMAL PROVISION OF A CENTRAL PARK IN A CITY*
研究了城市中央公园有效供给的条件与决策规则，发现需考虑与住宅用地的竞争成本，且公共土地所有权下的公园规模大于私人土地所有权。
ABSTRACT In this paper, I examine the conditions and decision rules pertaining to the efficient provision of a central park in a city (provision that must satisfy the Samuelson condition). An interesting finding is that an additional opportunity cost that results from competition with residential use must be included to determine the efficient size of a central park. An efficient central park is larger in a city with public landownership than in a city with absentee landownership. Profit maximization and population maximization can be used as decision rules to determine the efficient provision of a central park in both an open city with absentee landownership and one with public landownership. The net benefit of a central park in a closed city with absentee landownership is reflected not only in the land rent or profit, but also in the utility level, while that of a closed city with public landownership is fully reflected in the utility level. It is not feasible to determine the efficient size of a central park for a closed city with either absentee or public landownership solely based on observable market information.