CEO Tenure And Company Invention Under Differing Levels of Technological Dynamism
研究了技术动态性如何调节CEO任期与公司发明活动的关系，发现短期CEO在高动态技术环境下促进更多发明，而长期CEO在稳定技术下更有利。
Following from research on firms' upper echelons, this article examines the previously unstudied issue of how technological dynamism moderates the relationship between a CEO's time in office and company inventive activities. We evaluate this relationship in the biopharmaceutical industry, a technology- and invention-intensive context. As would be expected from notions of a CEO life cycle, our results indicate a curvilinear, inverted U-shaped overall relationship between CEO tenure and invention. But technological dynamism shifts this curve in such a way that short-tenured CEOs engender more invention under highly dynamic technological environments, while long-tenured CEOs spur greater invention under more stable technologies.