Expected Revenue from Open and Sealed Bid Auctions
解释了为何不同拍卖规则下卖家预期收益相同，并分析了风险厌恶和信念相关性如何打破收益等价，对拍卖设计者和研究者有参考价值。
The first objective of this paper has been to explain why it is that expected seller revenue is the same under very different auction rules. The second objective has been to explain why revenue equivalence no longer holds once the central assumptions of risk aversion and independence of beliefs are modified. The effect of risk aversion is to make a sealed high bid auction more attractive from a seller's viewpoint. The effect of correlated beliefs is to favor open bidding. Which of the two factors dominates under plausible assumptions about risk aversion parameters and about the degree to which beliefs are correlated remains an important open question.