扩展Cyert-March双寡头模型:组织与经济洞见

Extending the Cyert-March Duopoly Model: Organizational and Economic Insights

ORGANIZATION SCIENCE · 2000
被引 28
人大 AFT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

通过两项研究,探索Cyert-March双寡头模型中组织行为(如冲突解决、不确定性规避)对经济绩效(利润、价格、市场份额)的影响,发现组织绩效差的企业经济绩效也差,且模型与五个寡头市场经验事实一致。

Abstract

Two studies were conducted to further explore the organizational and economic insights provided by the Cyert-March duopoly model (C-M) described in A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (ABTOF, Cyert and March 1963). Study 1 examined the extent to which two firms that differed solely in the decision behavior of a routine would also differ in organizational (quasiresolution of conflict, uncertainty avoidance, problem-driven search, and organizational learning) and economic (profit, price, market share, cost) measures and impacts. Three such manipulations were separately examined, where each manipulation altered the relative propensity of the firm to be more or less reactive to three events: production growth pressure, price adjustment under organizational goal conflict, and initial price adjustment under profit goal failure. Analysis of the behaviors revealed how subtle changes in these key routines could generate complex organizational and economic effects that impact firm success. The dominant result demonstrated that organizations that did not perform well organizationally did not perform well economically. In addition, higher reactivity resulted in higher costs, in part because of quantified organizational constructs (e.g., slack, pressure). Study 2 examined the data from the first study to determine the extent to which the performance of the duopoly was consistent with a set of eight stylized economic facts drawn from the empirical literature on oligopoly. Study 2 demonstrated consistency with five of the eight stylized economic facts and provided partial support for two others. We conclude that behavioral constructs of ABTOF, as articulated in the Cyert-March duopoly model, provide behavior and performance capabilities that bridge the gap between game-theoretic models of duopoly and the computational and informational realities of organizations.

双寡头组织行为微观经济学产业组织企业理论