Myopic Versus Intertemporal Manipulation in Decentralized Planning Procedures
研究私有品交换经济中分散规划程序的操纵行为，推广了Champsaur-Laroque（1980）的结果，证明当短视操纵的纳什均衡唯一时，跨期操纵在时间区间[0,T]上的结果会随T趋于无穷而趋向竞争均衡，且仅当初始配置是帕累托最优时存在无穷时间下的纳什均衡。
Manipulation is studied in abstract planning procedures in exchange economies with private goods and a generalization of the results of Champsaur-Laroque (1980) is obtained. When the Nash equilibrium corresponding to myopic manipulation is unique, the outcome of consistent intertemporal manipulation on a time interval [0, T] is characterized. It is shown that when T goes to infinity, the resulting allocation tends towards a competitive equilibrium. For T equal to infinity, there exists a Nash equilibrium only when the initial allocation is Pareto-optimal.