Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information
描述了一个简单的两人两期谈判博弈，使用完美贝叶斯均衡求解，分析谈判成本、合同区域大小和谈判时长对僵局概率和让步可能性的影响，发现信息传递与缺乏预先承诺的结合产生了许多反直觉的结果。
This paper describes a simple two-person, two-period bargaining game, and solves it using the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, in which the actions of each player convey information which is used by his opponent. The paper examines the effects of changes in bargaining costs, the size of the "contract zone" and the length of the bargaining process on such aspects of the solution as the probability of impasse and the likelihood of concessions. The combination of information transfer and the lack of pre-commitment embodied in perfectness yields many surprising results. Common perceptions about the effects of parameter changes on bargaining processes are suspect, and should be checked in the particular game being discussed.