Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
研究当所有代理人必须一致同意某项决策时，若每个人的私人价值信息不对称，随着代理人数量增加，有效决策的概率趋于零，即使大家都知道有效决策是好的。
A yes or no decision must be made about some issue. All agents must agree. The "Coase Theorem" asserts that the efficient outcome will always result. Suppose the value (positive or negative) that an individual attaches to an affirmative decision is privately known to that individual. It is proved, under very mild conditions, that with independent types, as the number of agents increases, the probability of an affirmative efficient decision goes to zero. An example in which it is common knowledge that an affirmative decision is efficient and yet the probability of such a decision goes to zero is given.