Statistical Discrimination with Employment Criteria
构建了统计歧视理论，解释企业如何因利润最大化对不同群体设置不同就业标准或面试机会，导致失业差异甚至群体被完全排除出劳动力市场，并讨论了歧视的效率问题。
This paper develops the theory of statistical discrimination in the form of unequal employment criteria and interviews. Workers differ by imperfectly observed 'quit rate.' Profit maximization leads firms to set stricter employment criteria or interview fewer workers from the group with a greater proportion of high-quit-rate workers. The theory can explain unemployment differences between groups and the total exclusion of a group from a labor market. Although statistical discrimination constitutes economic discrimination according to a criterion of harm to a group, it may or may not be efficient because of the presence of externalities. Copyright 1998 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.