Bank Bonuses and Bailouts
研究了银行内部代理问题如何内生地产生奖金合同，并分析了预期救助如何改变薪酬方案：风险转移问题导致奖金更陡、风险更高；努力问题则使薪酬更平、努力下降；当两种问题并存时，福利最大化的监管者应设定奖金上限，而提高经理责任可能适得其反。
This paper shows that bonus contracts may arise endogenously as a response to agency problems within banks, and analyzes how compensation schemes change in reaction to anticipated bailouts. If there is a risk‐shifting problem, bailout expectations lead to steeper bonus schemes and even more risk taking. If there is an effort problem, the compensation scheme becomes flatter and effort decreases. If both types of agency problems are present, a sufficiently large increase in bailout perceptions makes it optimal for a welfare‐maximizing regulator to impose caps on bank bonuses. In contrast, raising managers' liability can be counterproductive.