Advantageous Semi‐Collusion
研究生产卡特尔在研发等非生产活动上竞争时，对行业利润和消费者福利的影响，发现传统和修正观点都可能错误，双方可能同时受损或受益。
The textbook view that cartels increase industry profits and lower consumer welfare ignores the effects of competition in other activities. A revisionist view shows that when cartel members compete in other activities, i.e. when they semi‐collude, the cartel members may be worse off and consumers better off. Using a two‐stage model in which the non‐production activity is R&D and is subject to technological spillovers, we show that both the traditional and revisionist views can be wrong, that consumers and producers can both be made worse off, or both better off, by a semi‐collusive production cartel.